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Although autonoetic experience—a sense of mental time travel—has been considered as the 
hallmark of episodic future thinking, what determines this subjective feeling is not yet fully 
understood. Here, we investigated the role of autobiographical knowledge by manipulating 
the relevance of imagined events for personal goals. Participants were asked to imagine three 
types of events (goal-related future events, experimenter-provided future events, and 
atemporal events) and to assess various characteristics of their mental representations. The 
results showed that the three types of events were represented with similar levels of detail and 
vividness. Importantly, however, goal-related future events were associated with a stronger 
autonoetic experience. Furthermore, autonoetic experience was significantly predicted by the 
importance of imagined events for personal goals. These findings suggest that the subjective 
feeling of pre-experiencing one’s personal future in part depends on the extent to which 
imagined events can be placed in an autobiographical context. 
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The capacity to mentally simulate events that might happen in one’s personal future—
often referred to as episodic future thinking—has attracted growing interest in the past few 
years, probably due to the increasing recognition of its importance in the regulation of human 
behavior (Schacter, 2012; Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & Sripada, 2013; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007; Szpunar, 2010). Findings from cognitive, neuropsychological, and 
neuroimaging research have shown that episodic future thoughts are created based on 
informational components provided by episodic and semantic memory (i.e., specific past 
experiences and general knowledge about the world and the self), and multiple cognitive 
processes are engaged to retrieve, select, and assemble relevant pieces of information (for 
reviews, see D’Argembeau, 2015; Irish & Piguet, 2013; Klein, 2013; Schacter et al., 2012). 
These representational systems and cognitive processes are supported by a distributed set of 
brain regions, involving frontal, parietal, and temporal areas (Benoit & Schacter, 2015; 
Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015).  
Despite these significant advances in understanding how future event representations 
are formed, the hallmark of episodic future thinking—the subjective sense of “pre-
experiencing” a future event (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Klein, 2016; Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007; Szpunar, 2011; Tulving, 2005)—remains somewhat mysterious. What gives us the 
subjective feeling that an event currently represented in our minds refers to something that 
might happen in our personal future rather than, say, a mere fantasy? According to Tulving 
(1985, 2002, 2005), the sense of navigating a personal future is a manifestation of autonoetic 
consciousness, defined as “a form of consciousness that allows individuals to apprehend their 
subjective experiences throughout time, and to perceive the present moment as both a 
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continuation of their past and as a prelude to their future” (Tulving, 2002, p. 315).1 On this 
view, episodic future thinking does not only involve the mental simulation of specific events 
(based on information stored in memory), but also the capacity to locate imagined events at 
subjective times other than the present (Szpunar, 2011; Tulving, 2005). It is the combination 
of these two components—event simulation and autonoetic consciousness—that would give 
rise to the feeling of mental time travel (Klein, 2016). The precise conditions under which this 
subjective experience emerges are not fully understood, however.  
A few studies have started to explore this question by examining factors that are 
predictive of the qualities of subjective experience during episodic future thinking—an 
experimental phenomenological approach (Johnson, 1988). In most of these studies, 
autonoetic consciousness is assessed by asking participants to rate their feeling of 
experiencing imagined events and feeling of travelling forward in time.2 D’Argembeau and 
Van der Linden (2004) manipulated the emotional valence and temporal distance of imagined 
events. It was found that participants reported greater autonoetic feelings and more vivid 
mental representations when imagining positive rather than negative, and temporally close 
rather than distant, future events (see also Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 
2013). Szpunar and McDermott (2008) investigated the influence of the familiarity of 
contextual settings in which imagined future events take place. The results showed that future 
events imagined in familiar settings (e.g., at home) were rated as more detailed and were 
associated with stronger feelings of pre-experience and mental time travel than events 
imagined in unfamiliar settings (e.g., in the jungle) (see also Robin & Moscovitch, 2014). 
Arnold, McDermott, and Szpunar (2011a) reported similar findings, and further showed that 
                                                            
1 A variety of terms has been proposed to refer to consciousness of subjective time, including autonoetic 
consciousness or autonoesis (Tulving, 2005), chronestesia (Tulving, 2002), and temporal consciousness (Dalla 
Barba & Boissé, 2010). Although there are subtle differences between these concepts, they all involve the 
capacity to apprehend the temporal dimension of one’s experiences. Here we use the term autonoetic 
consciousness because it is most frequently used in the field of episodic memory and future thinking.  
2 These two dimensions derive from the idea that autonoetic consciousness involves both a “self” aspect 
(representing an experience as one’s own) and a notion of subjective time (representing an experience as 
referring to a time other than the present) (Tulving, 2002, 2005). 
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the effect of temporal distance on the subjective qualities of mental representations was at 
least partly due to differences in the familiarity of imagined settings. 
Looking at patterns of relations between various characteristics of episodic future 
thoughts, D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2012) found that the familiarity of imagined 
contents (i.e., location and persons/objects) was a significant predictor of the subjective 
vividness of mental representations, which in turn predicted autonoetic experience. 
Interestingly, however, autonoetic feelings were not entirely explained by the subjective 
vividness of represented contents. Another variable that independently predicted autonoetic 
experience was the goal-relevance of imagined events: future events that were more related to 
personal goals were associated with greater feelings of pre-experience and mental time travel. 
The role of personal relevance in autonoetic experience is also suggested by studies showing 
that the degree to which people report feelings of pre-experience and mental time travel when 
imagining future events is related to individual differences in future time perspective (i.e., a 
general concern for the future, including a focus on planning and future goals; Arnold, 
McDermott, & Szpunar, 2011b) and self-consciousness (i.e., the tendency to think about one’s 
beliefs, aspirations, and values; D’Argembeau, Ortoleva, Jumentier, & Van der Linden, 
2010). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the feeling of navigating a personal future 
depends on at least two factors: the subjective vividness of mental representations (which 
itself depends, in part, on the familiarity of imagined contents), and the extent to which 
imagined events are personally relevant. Autonoetic experience likely requires the 
construction of a detailed and coherent event representation—a process that has been referred 
to as episodic simulation (Schacter & Addis, 2007) or scene construction (Hassabis & 
Maguire, 2007). This process may be necessary but not sufficient, however, as people can 
construct detailed representations of fictitious events that are not experienced as being located 
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in time (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007). A full-blown autonoetic experience 
might only emerge when imagined events are meaningfully embedded in an autobiographical 
context, for example by linking imagined events to personal goals and general expectations 
about one’s life. Autobiographical knowledge might indeed provide a personal timeline on 
which imagined events can be placed (Conway, 2005; Fivush, 2011; Thomsen, 2015), thereby 
contributing to the subjective sense of mentally visiting one’s personal future. On this view, 
episodic future thinking is more than the mere simulation of specific events; imagined events 
also have to be meaningfully linked to one’s personal life (D’Argembeau, 2015).  
If the above view is correct, autonoetic experience should vary depending on whether 
or not an imagined event is set into a future personal context. Although this potential role of 
autobiographical knowledge has not been investigated systematically, one study has compared 
the subjective characteristics of mental representations of future and atemporal events (de 
Vito, Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 2012). In a first experiment, participants were instructed to 
imagine future events occurring in familiar settings (e.g., ‘‘Imagine walking in a sunny garden 
next year’’), future events occurring in unfamiliar settings (e.g., ‘‘Imagine walking in a 
tropical jungle next year’’), and atemporal events occurring in familiar settings (e.g., 
‘‘Imagine sitting in your preferred coffee shop’’). For each event, participants rated the 
subjective vividness of their mental representation and their feeling of experiencing the event. 
In line with previous studies (see above), future events occurring in familiar settings were 
more vividly represented and were associated with greater feelings of experiencing than 
future events occurring in unfamiliar settings. However, there was no difference between 
future and atemporal events occurring in familiar settings. In a second experiment, de Vito et 
al. (2012) asked participants to imagine themselves in future or atemporal events (as in the 
first experiment), and to imagine someone else in future events (e.g., ‘‘Imagine Silvio 
Berlusconi walking on the beach next year’’). The results showed that the three types of 
events received similar ratings for subjective vividness, but that the feeling of experiencing 
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was higher when imagining oneself rather than someone else in future events. As in the first 
experiment, feelings of experiencing did not differ when imagining oneself in future or 
atemporal events.  
Although intriguing, these findings are open to different interpretations. The absence 
of difference between mental representations of future and atemporal events could imply that 
the temporal location of imagined events is irrelevant to autonoetic experience. Two 
important issues should be noted, however. First, as suggested above, the temporal dimension 
of autonoetic experience might only arise when imagined events are set in an autobiographical 
context, and it is unclear whether this was the case in the de Vito et al. (2012) study. Indeed, 
the to-be-imagined future events were constrained by the experimenter (e.g., ‘‘Imagine 
walking in a sunny garden next year’’), such that participants might not have necessarily 
linked these events to their own personal lives. Our view is that an imagined event such as a 
“walk in a sunny garden next year” will only be perceived as a “real” future event to the 
extent that it can be meaningfully integrated with general knowledge and expectations about 
one’s future life (e.g., imagining walking in the gardens of the palace of Versailles that one 
intends to visit during a holiday in France planned for the next summer). Absent this 
connection with autobiographical knowledge, an imagined event might not be experienced as 
a future happening. Second, it should be noted that only one dimension of autonoetic 
consciousness—the feeling of experiencing events—was investigated in the de Vito et al. 
(2012) study. One can certainly have the feeling of experiencing an imagined event without 
necessarily placing this event in time, but a full-blown autonoetic experience involves an 
additional ingredient: the feeling of mental time travel. 
Considering these issues, we aimed to replicate and extend the de Vito et al. (2012) 
study by adding another condition in which imagined future events would be more easily 
placed in an autobiographical context. In short, participants were asked to imagine three types 
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of events: future and atemporal events that were cued in a similar way as in the de Vito et al. 
study, and future events that were cued by personal goals. We did not expect that these three 
event conditions would necessarily differ in terms of the subjective vividness of mental 
representations, but we predicted that autonoetic experience would be enhanced for future 
events that were cued by personal goals compared to future events constrained by the 
experimenter, as the former should be more easily placed in an autobiographical context. To 
further investigate the role of autobiographical knowledge in autonoetic experience, we also 
investigated whether the personal relevance of imagined events uniquely contributed to the 
prediction of autonoetic feelings after controlling for other event dimensions that have been 





Thirty undergraduates (10 males), all native French speakers, participated in this 
experiment as volunteers. Their average age was 21.27 (SD = 2.07) years. All participants 
reported to be free of neurological or psychiatric disorders. The sample size was estimated a 
priori using G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) in order to achieve 80% 
power, considering an alpha error of .05 and a medium within-subject effect size (Cohen’s f = 
0.25). 
2.2. Materials and procedure 
Participants were asked to imagine a series of events in response to six cue sentences. 
Four of the cues were adapted and translated into French from previous studies of scene 
construction (de Vito et al., 2012; Hassabis et al., 2007): Imagine lying on a sunny, crowded 
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beach; Imagine walking in a sunny garden; Imagine sitting in your favourite pub; and 
Imagine you are standing in the middle of a bustling street market. For two of these cues, 
participants were instructed to imagine an atemporal situation (i.e., to imagine an event 
without locating it in time; hereafter referred to as atemporal events), while for the two other 
cues they were instructed to imagine a situation happening in the future (hereafter referred to 
as nonpersonal future events) and an exact time indication was provided (e.g., imagine 
walking in a sunny garden in a year); the use of cues as atemporal versus future events was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
The remaining two cues were derived from the personal goals of the participants. 
Between one and seven days before the main experiment, participants had to report five 
personal goals on an online questionnaire, to rate the importance of each goal, and to estimate 
when they believed each goal could be achieved. Personal goals were defined as personally 
important projects that are frequently thought about, for which one makes plans, and that one 
strives to achieve (Emmons, 1986; Little, 1983). It was specified that these projects could 
refer to any life domain, such as school, work, family, intimate relationships, material goods, 
and leisure activities. The two most important goals were selected as cues for the imagination 
task. These goals did not directly refer to a specific future event (e.g., going to study abroad, 
living with my girlfriend, creating a music band). Each cue also included a time period which 
corresponded to the time when participants believed their goal could be achieved (e.g., 
creating a music band in a year; hereafter referred to as personal future events). To match the 
future personal and future nonpersonal conditions with respect to the temporal distance of 
imagined events, the two time periods used in the nonpersonal condition were always the 
same as the time periods specified in the future personal condition.  
All six cues (two atemporal, two nonpersonal future, and two personal future) were 
presented separately on a computer screen. For each cue sentence, participants were instructed 
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to imagine a specific event (i.e., specific in time and place, and lasting some minutes up to 24 
hours) in as much detail as possible, including details about location, actions, people, objects, 
emotions, and so on. It was further specified that the imagined events should be novel (i.e., 
not experienced before) and that future events should be plausible (i.e., might reasonably 
happen). Once participants had an event in mind they were asked to verbally describe it, and 
descriptions were recorded using a digital audio-recorder for later transcription and scoring. 
The order of presentation of events was counterbalanced across participants. Before starting 
the task, two practice trials (Imagine buying things in a supermarket in a week; Imagine 
walking in a big city) were conducted with each participant in order to ensure that all 
instructions were correctly understood. If necessary the instructions were orally repeated 
during the experiment. 
After each description (for which no time limit was imposed), participants were asked 
to rate the reported event on a questionnaire evaluating the phenomenological characteristics 
of mental representations, as well as different event features that have been previously linked 
to phenomenological experience (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012; de Vito et al., 
2012). All dimensions were rated using a 7-point Likert scale. Some items assessed sensory-
perceptual qualities of mental representations: their overall clarity (1 = not at all clear, 7 = 
extremely clear), clarity of the location (1 = not at all clear, 7 = extremely clear), clarity of 
people/objects (1 = not at all clear, 7 = extremely clear), amount of visual details (1 = none, 7 
= a lot), and amount of other sensory details (auditory, olfactory, gustative and/or tactile; 1 = 
none, 7 = a lot). Autonoetic consciousness was assessed by rating the feeling of really 
experiencing the situation “as if I was there” (1 = not at all, 7 = totally), and the impression of 
going into the future and find oneself at the time when the event would happen (1 = not at all, 
7 = totally).  
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Other items assessed some properties of imagined events, such as event novelty (“I 
have already experienced the same or a similar event”; 1 = never, 7 = very often), the 
familiarity of location (1 = not at all familiar, 7 = extremely familiar), the familiarity of 
persons and objects (1 = not at all familiar, 7 = extremely familiar), the personal importance 
of the event with respect to personal goals and values (1 = not at all important, 7 = very 
important), its affective valence (- 3 = very negative, 0 = neutral, 3 = very positive), and the 
extent to which it had been previously thought about (1 = never, 7 = very often). Event 
plausibility was also assessed, both in terms of general plausibility (“This event could 
plausibly happen to everyone”; 1 = not at all plausible, 7 = extremely plausible) and personal 
plausibility (“This event could plausibly happen to me personally”; 1 = not at all plausible, 7 
= extremely plausible) (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004). Finally, participants 
assessed the subjective difficulty to imagine the event (1 = very difficult, 7 = very easy), 
whether, while imagining the event, other specific (past or future) events which are connected 
to it came spontaneously to their mind (1 = none, 7 = a lot), and whether they thought about 
their life in general (e.g., about their goals, expectations, and so on; 1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much). The total testing time was between 45 and 60 minutes. 
 
2.3. Scoring 
Verbal descriptions of each event were transcribed and the numbers of internal and 
external details were assessed using the standardized scoring procedure developed by Levine, 
Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, and Moscovitch (2002). The central event was defined in order to 
segment the transcription into internal details (i.e., details referring to the main event, 
including happenings, people, time, place, sensory perceptions, thoughts, and emotions) and 
external details (i.e., details that do not refer to the main event, semantic information, 
repetitions and metacognitive statements), and the numbers of internal and external details 
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were tallied. All transcriptions were scored by the first author and a second rater 
independently scored a random selection (20%) of the descriptions to assess the reliability of 
scoring. Intraclass correlation coefficients (two-way random effects; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) 




For each dependent variable, data were averaged across the two events in each 
condition and were analysed using a one-way (type of events: atemporal, nonpersonal future, 
personal future) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). When the assumption of 
sphericity was not met, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used. 
3.1. Richness of mental representations 
We first examined the amount of details reported in the verbal descriptions of 
imagined events (Figure 1). The number of reported details did not differ significantly 
between the three event conditions, neither for internal details, F(2, 58) = 0.93, p = .40, ߟ௣ଶ= 
.03, nor for external details, F(1.56, 45.15) = 2.03, p = .14, ߟ௣ଶ= .07. Next, we computed an 
index of the subjective vividness of mental representations (Figure 2) by averaging ratings of 
overall clarity, clarity of location, clarity of people/objects, amount of visual details, and 
amount of other sensory details (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74). This index did not differ 
significantly between the three types of imagined events, F(2, 58) = 0.73, p = .48, ߟ௣ଶ= .02. 
The same result was obtained when analyzing separately each rating scale composing the 
subjective richness index.  
3.2. Autonoetic experience 
13 
 
The mean ratings for the two dimensions of autonoetic experience are shown in Figure 
3. The type of imagined events had a significant influence on both the feeling of experiencing, 
F(2, 58) = 3.47, p = .04, ߟ௣ଶ= .11, and the feeling of mental time travel, F(2, 58) = 19.20, p < 
.001, ߟ௣ଶ= .40. Planned comparisons showed that feelings of experiencing were higher for 
personal future events than both nonpersonal future events, t(29) = 2.08, p = .047, d = 0.36, 
and atemporal events, t(29) = 2.48, p = .02, d = 0.41, while nonpersonal future and atemporal 
events did not differ from each other, t(29) = 0.40, p = .69, d = 0.07. The impression of going 
into the future was also higher for personal future events than both nonpersonal future events, 
t(29) = 3.52, p < .001, d = 0.61, and atemporal events, t(29) = 5.84, p < .001, d = 1.14; 
nonpersonal future events were associated with a higher impression of going into the future 
than atemporal events, t(29) = 2.89, p = .01, d = 0.51. 
3.3. Event properties 
The mean ratings and results of the ANOVAs for the properties of imagined events are 
shown in Table 1. As expected, the personal importance of imagined events differed 
significantly between the three conditions: personal future events were judged as more 
important than both nonpersonal future events and atemporal events (all ps < .001), and 
nonpersonal future events did not differ from atemporal events (p = .15). Similar differences 
between the three types of events were also noted for affective valence, frequency of previous 
thoughts, personal plausibility, and thoughts about one’s life: for each of these variables, 
personal future events received higher ratings than both nonpersonal and atemporal future 
events (all ps < .05), whereas nonpersonal and atemporal events did not differ from each 
other. Finally, the familiarity of persons/objects also varied as a function of the type of 
imagined events: personal future events were rated as involving more familiar persons/objects 
than nonpersonal future events (p < .001); atemporal events did not differ significantly from 
either personal future (p = .11) or nonpersonal future (p = .30) events. The other event 
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properties (i.e., event novelty, familiarity of location, general plausibility, connection with 
other events, and subjective difficulty of imagination) did not differ significantly between the 
three types of events.  
3.4. Predicting autonoetic experience when imagining events 
The preceding analyses showed that autonoetic feelings were rated higher when 
imagining personal future events than both nonpersonal future events and atemporal events. 
While this finding supports our hypothesis that the personal relevance of events plays an 
important role in autonoetic experience, it should be noted that personal future events differed 
from nonpersonal and atemporal events on multiple event features other than personal 
importance (i.e., emotional valence, frequency of previous thoughts, personal plausibility, and 
thoughts about one’s life). Our next goal was then to determine which of these variables are 
related to autonoetic feelings when imagining events, and to investigate whether personal 
importance provides a unique contribution to the prediction of autonoetic experience.  
To investigate these questions, we first looked at the bivariate associations between 
autonoetic experience and the various event properties investigated in this study. For these 
analyses, the two rating scales assessing autonoetic feelings (i.e., the feeling of experiencing 
and the impression of going into the future) were averaged to form a single index of 
autonoetic experience. As in the preceding analyses, we also computed an index of the 
subjective vividness of mental representations. Due to their hierarchical structure (i.e., the 
sampled events were nested within participants and thus were not independent), data were 
analyzed using multilevel modeling (random intercept models; Goldstein, 2011), with events 
as level 1 units and participants as level 2 units.  
As can be seen from Table 2, autonoetic experience was significantly related to the 
subjective vividness and ease of construction of imagined events, as well as multiple event 
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properties: familiarity of imagined contents (location and persons/objects), personal 
importance, emotional valence, frequency of previous thoughts, and personal plausibility. In 
addition, autonoetic experience was also related to the extent to which participants thought 
about other events and about their lives during the construction process.  
A series of multilevel regression models were constructed to examine the unique 
contribution of these variables to the prediction of autonoetic experience. Measures of 
subjective vividness and ease of construction were introduced first in a regression model 
because previous studies have shown that autonoetic experience substantially depends on the 
subjective sensory-perceptual qualities of mental representations (D’Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2012; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). These two variables significantly 
contributed to autonoetic experience (likelihood ratio, LR = 69.21, df = 2, p < .001). Adding 
the familiarity of imagined contents (location and persons/objects) to this model did not result 
in a significantly better fit (LR = 2.80, df = 2, p = .25), suggesting that the influence of 
familiarity on autonoetic experience was mediated by the subjective quality of mental 
representations.  
Next, we investigated to what extent the various event properties that differentiated the 
three types of imagined events (i.e., personal importance, frequency of previous thoughts, 
emotional valence, personal plausibility, and thoughts about one’s life) uniquely contributed 
to autonoetic experience. Adding these variables simultaneously to a regression model that 
already included subjective vividness and ease of construction as predictors resulted in a 
significantly better fit (LR = 55.85, df = 5, p < .001).3 However, only personal importance and 
personal plausibility provided a significant unique contribution to the prediction of autonoetic 
experience. Therefore, the best and most parsimonious model was to use subjective richness, 
                                                            
3 Although most of the predictor variables included in this model were intercorrelated (see Supplementary Table 
1), simulation experiments have shown that the estimation bias is negligible for fixed-effect parameter estimates 
and small to moderate for their corresponding standard errors for this magnitude of correlations among level 1 
predictors (Shieh & Fouladi, 2003). 
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ease of construction, personal importance, and personal plausibility to predict autonoetic 
experience (Table 3). This model accounted for 60% of the within-participants variance (i.e., 
variation among events) in autonoetic feelings. 
 
4. Discussion 
While important progress has recently been made in elucidating the formation of 
episodic future thoughts, the subjective feeling of pre-experiencing imagined events is not yet 
fully understood. In this study, we investigated whether autonoetic experience is modulated 
by the extent to which imagined events can be placed in an autobiographical context. 
Participants imagined a series of future events that were cued by their personal goals, as well 
as future and atemporal events that were constrained by experimenter-provided cues. In line 
with de Vito et al. (2012), we found that the characteristics of atemporal and future event 
representations were largely indistinguishable (in terms of the richness of mental 
representations, autonoetic feelings, and other event properties, such as familiarity, 
importance, and plausibility) when imagined events were constructed in response to 
experimenter-provided cues. Importantly, however, our results suggest that at least some 
imagined events constrained by experimenter-provided cues were not truly autobiographical, 
in the sense that participants did not necessarily link the imagined situations to their own 
personal lives. Indeed, compared to future events that were explicitly connected to personal 
goals, events constructed in response to experimenter-provided cues received lower ratings 
for personal importance, personal plausibility, and thoughts about one’s life during the 
construction process.4  
                                                            
4 It should be noted that we do not claim that events constructed in response to experimenter-provided cues are 
never autobiographical events; they may or may not be, depending on the extent to which the individual is able 
to integrate the proposed event with general knowledge and expectations about his or her personal life. The 
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When looking at the characteristics of mental representations, we found that the three 
types of events (i.e., atemporal, nonpersonal future, and personal future events) were 
represented with similar levels of detail and vividness, as assessed by the amount of episodic 
details included in verbal reports and by ratings of subjective vividness. On the other hand, 
autonoetic experience significantly varied as a function of the type of imagined events: future 
events that were cued by personal goals were associated with a higher feeling of experiencing 
the situation and a greater impression of going into the future compared to atemporal and 
future events that were constructed in response to experimenter-provided cues. Thus, the 
personal relevance of the cues did not influence the richness of imagined contents, but instead 
modulated the degree to which participants were autonoetically aware of the represented 
events. Furthermore, in line with previous findings (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012), 
we found that the personal importance and plausibility of imagined events were significant 
predictors of autonoetic experience, even after controlling for the subjective vividness of 
mental representations.  
Taken together, these findings support the view that the subjective feeling of travelling 
through time to pre-experience one’s personal future in part depends on the extent to which 
imagined events can be meaningfully placed in an autobiographical context. How knowledge 
about personal goals modulates this feeling remains to be investigated in detail, but one 
possible mechanism would be that the goal structure of an individual provides a personal 
timeline on which imagined events can be placed (Fivush, 2011; Thomsen, 2015). Goals may 
contribute to link and organize specific episodic representations into a meaningful sequence 
of events that define a person’s future life. Thus, the subjective sense of visiting one’s 
personal future may not lie in any single event taken in isolation but may only arise when an 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
important point here is that, on average, future events cued by personal goals were more likely to be truly 
autobiographical than experimenter-provided future events.  
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event is connected to other anticipated events and/or general beliefs and expectations about 
one’s life. 
The present study adds to growing evidence showing that personal goal processing is 
an important component of episodic future thinking. Previous studies have shown that 
personal goals facilitate the construction of episodic future thoughts (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 
2011), shape the content of future simulations to make goal-relevant features more salient 
(Christian, Miles, Fung, Best, & Macrae, 2013), and help link and organize imagined events 
in coherent themes and sequences (D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012; Demblon & 
D’Argembeau, 2014). Here we further demonstrate that personal goals contribute to the very 
core of the subjective experience associated with episodic future thought—the sense of mental 
time travel. Overall, these studies clearly indicate that personal goal processing is an integral 
part of episodic future thinking, a view that is also supported by neuroimaging data showing 
that thinking about personal goals and imagining specific future events are associated with 
common brain activations (for a meta-analysis, see Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015).  
Although, by definition, autonoetic experience refers to a subjective state and thus 
should primarily be assessed using subjective responses (Jack & Roepstorff, 2002; Klein, 
2015), the additional collection of objective measures could be useful to further shed light on 
processes that give rise or modulate this subjective state. Of particular interest, recent fMRI 
studies have shown that subjective experiences associated with remembering past events can 
be reliably predicted from distributed patterns of brain activity (Rissman, Chow, Reggente, & 
Wagner, 2016), and that such patterns can give insights into the types of information that are 
used for making subjective memory judgments (Johnson, Kuhl, Mitchell, Ankudowich, & 
Durbin, 2015). These techniques of multivoxel pattern classification of fMRI data could be 
adapted to further investigate the basis of autonoetic experience when imagining future 
events. A candidate brain region for placing specific event representations in an 
19 
 
autobiographical context is the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Lesion studies have indeed 
revealed that, while the medial temporal lobe is similarly involved in imagining atemporal 
and future events (Hassabis et al., 2007), focal lesions to the mPFC are associated with greater 
difficulties in imagining future compared to atemporal fictitious experiences (Bertossi, Aleo, 
Braghittoni, & Ciaramelli, 2016), suggesting that the mPFC plays some specific role in 
episodic future thinking. Neuroimaging data further suggest that the mPFC may function to 
integrate specific event representations with higher-order autobiographical knowledge 
(Demblon, Bahri, & D’Argembeau, 2016). Through this integrative process, the mPFC might 
contextualize specific event representations within one's life story, thereby contributing to the 
subjective sense of pre-experiencing one’s personal future during the imagination process. 
Overall, the present and previous findings suggest that episodic future thinking relies 
on (at least) two distinct component processes: the construction of a detailed event 
representation, and the integration of this event in an autobiographical context (D’Argembeau, 
2015). In his conceptualization of autobiographical memory, Conway (2001, 2005) proposed 
a similar distinction between specific event memories and conceptual autobiographical 
knowledge, which provides an organizing context for remembered events. By extending the 
scope of the autobiographical knowledge base to conceptual representations of one’s personal 
future, this framework may prove useful to account for accumulating evidence showing that 
episodic future thinking involves more than scene construction. The crux of episodic future 
thinking may indeed lie in the conjunction of scene construction and contextualizing 
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Table 1. Mean ratings (and standard deviations) of event properties 
 Atemporal Nonpersonal future Personal future F(2, 58)a p ߟ௣ଶ 
Personal importance 2.78 (1.19) 3.22 (1.31) 6.10 (0.99) 82.99 < .001 .74 
Affective valence  0.85 (1.03) 1.25 (1.08) 1.75 (1.10) 7.56 .001 .21 
Previous thoughts 2.22 (1.06) 2.13 (0.92) 4.37 (1.71) 44.63 < .001 .61 
Novelty 2.47 (1.07) 2.65 (1.03) 2.32 (1.14) 1.12 .33 .04 
Familiarity of location 3.47 (1.46) 3.22 (1.16) 3.77 (1.19) 1.28 .29 .04 
Familiarity of persons/objects 3.73 (1.15) 3.40 (1.09) 4.32 (1.44) 4.13 .02 .13 
General plausibility 5.55 (0.90) 5.55 (0.78) 5.12 (1.32) 2.62 .08 .08 
Personal plausibility 5.30 (0.95) 5.35 (0.79) 6.00 (0.81) 10.82 < .001 .27 
Connection to other events 3.38 (1.35) 3.18 (1.30) 3.70 (1.71) 1.42 .25 .05 
Thoughts about one’s life 2.31 (1.21) 2.68 (1.39) 4.70 (1.39) 50.26 < .001 .63 
Ease of construction 4.82 (0.87) 4.87 (0.94) 5.22 (0.86) 1.89 .16 .06 






Table 2. Bivariate associations between autonoetic experience and other variables 
Explanatory variable Standardized 
coefficient 
Z-ratio p 
Subjective vividness .51 9.83 < .001 
Ease of construction .50 10.14 < .001 
Novelty  .11 1.63 .10 
Familiarity of location .22 3.84 < .001 
Familiarity of persons/objects .32 5.79 < .001 
Personal importance .46 9.24 < .001 
Valence .38 6.46 < .001 
Previous thoughts .44 8.22 < .001 
General plausibility -.04 0.63 .53 
Personal plausibility .37 6.03 < .001 
Connection to other events .32 4.94 < .001 






Table 3. Standardized regression coefficients from a multilevel regression model predicting 
autonoetic experience from subjective richness, ease of construction, personal importance, 
and personal plausibility 
Explanatory variable Standardized 
coefficient 
Z-ratio p 
Subjective richness .25 4.43 < .001 
Ease of construction .21 3.76 < .001 
Personal importance .27 6.16 < .001 






Figure 1. Mean number of internal and external details reported in the verbal descriptions of 
imagined events. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
Figure 2. Mean ratings of subjective vividness as a function of the type of imagined events. 
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
Figure 3. Mean ratings of autonoetic experience as a function of the type of imagined events. 
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Supplementary Table 1. Intercorrelations between predictors at level 1 (within-participants) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Subjective vividness       
2. Ease of construction .65      
3. Personal importance .31 .35     
4. Previous thoughts .36 .40 .68    
5. Emotional valence .44 .40 .48 .40   
6. Personal plausibility .25 .31 .37 .40 .20  
7. Thoughts about one’s life .21 .27 .74 .52 .37 .34 
Note: Correlations in bold are significant at p < .001. 
 
 
